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Abstract
I investigate how long it takes for released inmates to find a job, and when they find a job,
how their incarceration rate changes. An on-the-job search model with crime is used to model
criminal behavior, derive the estimation method and analyze several policies including a job
placement program. The results show the unemployed are incarcerated twice as fast as the
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demonstrated that reducing the average unemployment spell of criminals by two months reduces
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1 Introduction
Empirical research has documented the correlation between crime, inequality and unemployment.
Theory claims the unemployed and employed earning a low wage face lower costs of commit-
ting crime and in turn perpetrate more of it. Therefore, if employment frictions contribute to
unemployment and inequality, then how would a policy aimed at reducing these frictions affect
unemployment, inequality and crime?
Others have asked similar questions. Imrohorog˘lu, Merlo & Rupert (2000) develop a dynamic
general equilibrium model with crime in order to investigate how income redistribution policies
influence crime and inequality. Engelhardt, Rocheteau & Rupert (2007) use a search and matching
model to see how labor market policies affect crime and unemployment.
Here, I take a model that simultaneously captures crime, inequality and unemployment and
integrate heterogeneous crime opportunities, workers and firms. After constructing a model from
the related literature, I develop a procedure that estimates the model’s parameters. Constructing and
estimating the model serves several purposes. First, it confirms the empirical link between crime
and unemployment demonstrated by Gould, Weinberg & Mustard (2002) and others. Estimation
also highlights how heterogeneity is essential in capturing crime, inequality and unemployment
simultaneously. Finally, the structural model with the estimated parameters is used to demonstrate
how policies aimed at reducing employment frictions, in particular a successful job placement
program, would reduce crime, unemployment and inequality.2
In constructing an empirically relevant model, I merge several ideas found in the related litera-
ture. In particular, the model I develop builds upon the on-the-job search model of crime proposed
by Burdett, Lagos & Wright (2004) by integrating heterogeneous types of workers and firms as
found in Burdett & Mortensen (1998). I add heterogeneous crime opportunities following Engel-
hardt et al. (2007). The resulting characteristics of the hybrid model are as follows. First, it takes
time for workers to find a job due to labor market search frictions and from these frictions unem-
ployment and wage inequality occur. Adding heterogeneous firms enables the model to accurately
characterize the observed wage distribution. Adding heterogeneous workers allows the model to
explain why some individuals do not engage in crime, a result dependent on how much individuals
2I do not explicitly explain how employment frictions can be reduced except for a small example in Section 4.
However, several studies have analyzed job placement programs for former inmates including Chung, Schmidt &
Witte (1991) and Visher, Winterfield & Coggeshall (2005).
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values their leisure. Finally, incorporating a distribution of crime opportunities accounts for the
fact that individuals accept opportunities to commit crime at different rates depending upon the
costs, i.e. whether they would lose a good paying job.
After constructing a model, I implement an estimation procedure to test whether crime deci-
sions are influenced by employment frictions. The likelihood function is derived from the model
and is able to identify employment frictions and incarceration rates using data taken from the Na-
tional Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The most relevant result is that individuals who are
unemployed are caught committing crime and imprisoned two times faster than low wage workers
and four times faster than high wage workers. Moreover, individuals released from jail take an
average of four and a half months to find a job.
Next, I turn to policy analysis. Consider, for example, a program capable of cutting the average
time it takes for criminals to find a job from four months to two months. What I find is that such a
program could reduce the equilibrium crime rate by more than five percent. Also, the same policy
can reduce the recidivism rate by roughly the same amount. As an alternative tool for fighting
crime, I find the elasticity of crime with respect to the duration of incarceration to be -0.18. This is
consistent with Levitt (2004) who finds the elasticity to be between -0.1 and -0.4 depending upon
the type of crime.
In evaluating how much employment frictions affect crime, I discover several other interesting
results. Specifically, I find further support that the duration of unemployment for those previously
incarcerated is roughly equal to the average, a finding in line with Grogger (1995). However,
the average wage offer for a criminal is 35% less than those never observed to be convicted and
incarcerated for a crime. In addition, I analyze how demographics are associated with criminal
participation, such as age, race, education and location of residence (urban/rural). In general, I
find those who face longer unemployment spells, such as blacks, commit more crime. Finally, the
estimation I propose provides a new approach in testing whether a relationship exists between an
individual’s criminal participation, employment status and wage. For instance, I find those paid
the minimum wage are incarcerated 25% less than those who are unemployed, while those paid in
the upper decile of the wage distribution are imprisoned 75% less.
Section 2 introduces the model’s environment and characterizes the equilibrium. Section 3
develops the estimation procedure, discusses the estimated parameters including demographic ef-
fects and analyzes the accuracy of the model. Finally, Section 4 discusses the model’s policy
3
implications.
2 Model
In this section, I present the model’s environment and outline the equilibrium.
2.1 Environment
The hybrid model is composed of assumptions taken from Burdett & Mortensen (1998), Burdett
et al. (2004) and Engelhardt et al. (2007). To begin, there exists a continuum of risk neutral
heterogeneous agents and firms who discount the future at rate r. There are two types of firms and
two types of agents.
Agents differ by their utility flow when unemployed, which is bk where k ∈ {c,nc}, bc <
bnc and φ is the proportion of type c agents. Unemployed agents receive job offers at rate λ0,
observe a wage offer drawn randomly from a wage offer distribution F(w), and if accepted, become
employed instantaneously and are paid the wage w over the tenure of the job.
Agent’s utility flow when employed is equal to their wage. They lose their jobs at rate δ and
receive new job offers at rate λ1 with a wage drawn randomly from F(w). Given acceptance of a
new wage offer, the agent changes jobs instantaneously.
Employed and unemployed agents receive crime opportunities at rate µ .3 The value of a crime
opportunity is drawn from a discrete distribution Γ(g) with the finite support G . The timing of the
crime opportunities is instantaneous where agents receive a crime opportunity, realize its payoff,
and decide whether to take the opportunity. If taken, the utility flow of a crime is instantaneous
and equal to its value.
Agents committing crime are instantaneously caught with probability pi , consume z while in
jail, and are released at rate ρ .
Firms have a linear production function and differ by their marginal (= average) revenue prod-
uct pi, where i ∈ {L,H}, pL < pH , and ϕ is the proportion of low productivity firms. Firms post
and commit to pay two types of wages, {wc,wnc}, depending upon an agent’s criminal history.4
3Even though the arrival rate of crime is independent of an agents labor force status, the employed individuals
could commit less crime due to the fact unemployed agents accept crime opportunities that the employed reject.
The potential for such a decision comes from adding heterogeneous crime opportunities. Also, allowing for a state
dependent µ will not change the estimated results below.
4Assuming firms pay their workers conditional on their criminal history will turn out to be identical to assuming
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There are several reasons for incorporating heterogeneous types of agents, crime opportunities
and firms into the environment. First, two types of agents allows for the possibility that some
individuals may never commit crime and risk imprisonment because of their high value of leisure
(or freedom). A distribution of crime opportunities captures the fact individuals commit crime at
different rates depending upon the costs. In other words, agents commit crime at different rates
because some accept lower value opportunities as their costs of being caught are lower. Finally, a
distribution of firm productivities enables the model to fit the wage distribution as demonstrated in
Section 3.5
2.2 Equilibrium
I will characterize the model’s equilibrium in the steady state. To begin, an equilibrium contains
a distribution of wage offers, F(w). On the supply side, agents maximize future expected utility
by following a set of reservation rules. In particular, they follow a reservation wage strategy for
taking a job. In other words, an agent of type k ∈ {c,nc} accepts any wage at or above Rk where the
reservation wage is determined at the point where agents are indifferent between unemployment
and being employed with a wage Rk. The other type of reservation strategy is the reservation crime
value. Following the same logic, the reservation crime value is identified at the point where an
agent is indifferent between accepting or declining a crime opportunity. For example, the unem-
ployed accept opportunities g > gu where gu is the crime reservation value of the unemployed and
g is located on the support G . Finally, an equilibrium contains a mass of individuals incarcerated,
unemployed and employed.
Before defining the equilibrium, I provide and discuss several important features of the envi-
ronment.
To begin, agents with a criminal history can be thought of as operating in an independent
there exists a criminal and non-criminal labor market. Also, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit and other federal
government programs offer employers the chance to reduce their tax liabilities conditional on if they hire workers with
a criminal history. Therefore, I assume criminals differ in their productivity to the firm, their duration of employment,
and in turn, the offered wage.
5I include only two types of firms because of the limited number of observations. The alternative specification given
the limited number of observations would be to assume a parametric form for firm productivity such as in Bontemps,
Robin & van den Berg (1999). I take the non-parametric approach because it is simple, easily interpreted and I argue
sufficient within the context of discussing crime. Bowlus, Kiefer & Neumann (1995) take a similar approach and
estimate the optimal number of firm types to be five. Given the model I propose and estimate, I demonstrate two is
adequate. The sample size imposes a constraint because of the link between firm productivity and crime opportunities,
which I explain in detail following Proposition 2.
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labor market. The idea is straight forward. Firms cannot decrease profits by using the information
about an agent’s criminal history. Therefore, due to the additively separable property of the profit
function, the wage offer distribution the criminal agents face, Fc(w), can be considered and solved
independently of the distribution the non-criminal agents face, Fnc(w). The fact implicitly implies
that firms observe an agent’s criminal history, assume the agent will commit crime again, and
therefore pay the agent accordingly.
Proposition 1 describes why agents’ valuations of leisure/freedom are important in determining
their decisions to commit crime.
Proposition 1 If an agent’s value of leisure is greater than a threshold value b then the agent
never engages in crime.
Intuitively, agents who place a high value on their leisure find the cost of imprisonment to be too
high and do not commit crime. Analytically, it is straightforward to show given a fixed value of z,
pi and ρ .
Proposition 1 is important for several reasons. First, it simplifies the model’s solution. Second,
the assumption that agents differ according to their value of leisure, b, has been used in the literature
such as Eckstein & Wolpin (1995) to enable the model to fit the observed wage distribution and
duration of unemployment simultaneously. Third, it can explain why some individuals might never
engage in crime. Fourth, it enables the model to accurately capture the observed recidivism and
crime rates simultaneously.6 Finally, the result provides an intuitive explanation for why some
individuals may never engage in crime: they value their freedom.
Taking from Proposition 1 and the reasons explained above, I assume a fraction of agents never
6With homogeneous b, the estimated model either overestimates the crime rate or underestimates the recidivism
rate. For example, take the best case scenario by assuming the lower bound on the amount of crime committed. If the
model’s crime rate is positive and it is at the lower bound then the unemployed must be the only ones committing crime.
Now, observe a few features of the data. First, the aggregate number of unemployed individuals is approximately 5%.
Second, the crime opportunities an unemployed individual takes is approximately 1 per month. Piehl & DiIulio (1995)
contain a detailed discussion of multiple microeconomic data sources for the number of opportunities, all of them
asserting roughly 12 per year. Alternatively, the number of crimes a criminal commits per month can be backed
out from the recidivism rate given the probability of being caught. In either case, the minimum amount of crime
in the model is roughly (1)(.05) = 5% per month. However, the monthly crime rate given by the FBI is roughly
.03% per month. Hence, the model with homogeneous agents produces more than fifteen times too much crime. From
Proposition 1, it is possible for only a fraction of the population to commit crime given heterogeneous values of leisure.
Thus, the model can produce an appropriate amount of crime given the mass of “criminal” agents is relatively small. I
estimate similar values for the number of crimes committed by an individual as found in Piehl & DiIulio (1995) given
pi is roughly 2.5%.
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commit crime or bc < b < bnc.7
From the assumption bc < b < bnc, the wage offer distributions Fc(w) and Fnc(w) can be solved
using only one type of agent. Although characterizing the “criminal labor market” with homoge-
neous agents is simplistic, it is appealing because it allows for a more transparent discussion about
the effects of employment frictions on crime because the results are not conditional on an agent’s
type.
The next simplification to the model’s equilibrium, and addition I make to the theory, discusses
the efficiency of the model’s equilibrium.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, if firms of the same type are offering wages above and below the
threshold to deter workers from a crime, then the equilibrium is not Pareto efficient.
To outline the idea, assume one agent is working and accepts any crime opportunity worth g or
more. Also, another agent is making a higher wage that deters him from accepting an opportunity
worth g. Assuming both agents work for the same type of firm, the firm with the worker who
takes the g opportunity is indifferent in switching to a wage that deters the worker from taking
it (otherwise the other firm would deviate since both firms are identical). Therefore, firms are
indifferent from deterring a crime opportunity worth g, while the criminal agents and their victims
are strictly better off. Hence, it is not Pareto efficient if firms of the same type are offering wages
above and below the threshold to deter agents from a crime opportunity.
Given Proposition 2, I simplify the equilibrium by assuming that identical type firms deter their
workers from the same type of crimes. In other words, firms of the same type lose workers at the
same rate even though they potentially pay different wages. Individuals paid different wages can
commit the same amounts of crime because Γ(g) is discrete. Although the assumption might seem
restrictive, it can be empirically tested. In addition, it can be relaxed by adding additional firms.
From a game theoretic perspective, the assumption can be viewed as allowing only symmetric
equilibria.
This leads me to the final simplifying result. Agents do not flow from high productivity firms
to low productivity firms.
7The implications of Proposition 1 can be derived from an alternative set of assumptions. For instance, incor-
porating human capital would imply an opportunity cost of imprisonment. Therefore, any assumption where agents
have heterogeneous values of human capital (and z) implies the same result as heterogeneous values of b since there
exists a threshold value, z, where agents do not commit crime. In Section 3, I look at how education affects crime,
unemployment and inequality.
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Proposition 3 High productivity firms pay higher wages than lower productivity firms.
The proof is given in the Appendix.
Figure 1 demonstrates the flows for an agent choosing to commit crime. At any point in time
there is a fraction of agents, ei,k, of type k who are employed at type i firms. In addition, there is a
fraction of unemployed agents uk of type k, and a fraction of agents in jail, nk. To reiterate, agents
do not flow from eH,k to eL,k due to Proposition 3. Also, as described in Proposition 2, individuals
employed by the same type of firm are deterred from the same type of crimes. Therefore, employed
individuals commit crime at a rate µΓ(ge,i), where Γ(g) = 1−Γ(g) and ge,i is the highest crime
value an agent will choose not to take given he is employed by firm i. Finally, the unemployed
criminal types commit crime at the same rate, µΓ(gu), where gu is the highest crime value the
unemployed agent will decline.
Figure 1: Flows
At this point, it is important to highlight the reason I incorporate a distribution of crime oppor-
tunities into the model. The reason is to allow for different criminal participation rates for those
unemployed and employed, or for those paid at the lower and higher end of the wage distribution.
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Analytically this means, Γ(ge,H)≤ Γ(ge,L)≤ Γ(gu), because higher productivity firms pay higher
wages and the cost of being caught is lower when unemployed than when employed.
At this stage, the equilibrium can be defined.
Definition 1 A steady-state equilibrium is defined by
(i) a set of reservation wages, Rk, for k ∈ {c,nc} that maximizes agents’ expected utility
(ii) crime reservation values conditional on unemployment, gu, employment at low productiv-
ity firms, ge,L, and employment at high productivity firms, ge,H , which maximize agents’
expected utility
(iii) a fraction of agents unemployed, uk, employed, ei,k, and incarcerated, nk for k ∈ {c,nc} and
i ∈ {L,H} that equate the flows in and out of each state
(iv) a crime rate
µΓ(gu)uc +µΓ(ge,L)eL,c +µΓ(ge,H)eH,c, and
(v) a wage offer distribution, F(w), that is based on firms maximizing steady-state profits.
The derivation of the wage distribution, incarceration rate, employment rate and unemployment
rate is completed in the Appendix.
Given the above definition and assumptions, the model has the potential for multiple equilibria
as first shown by Burdett, Lagos & Wright (2003). The resulting equilibria can be summarized
by the way employment and/or higher wages deter agents from committing crime. The number of
potential equilibria could be large depending upon the support of G , but I summarize them as
Characterization of Equilibria8
1. Γ(ge,H) = Γ(ge,L)< Γ(gu),
2. Γ(ge,H)< Γ(ge,L)≤ Γ(gu), and
3. Γ(ge,H) = Γ(ge,L) = Γ(gu).
The interpretation of the equilibria is critical in understanding the quantitative results. Equilibrium
1 is where employment deters agents from committing crime. In other words, all firms pay a
8As noted above, if an agent commits crime at all, then they commit crime when unemployed. It is seen by realizing
the costs of crime when an agent is unemployed are no more than when employed.
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high enough wage that an individual with a job commits less crime. Equilibrium 2 is where high
productivity firms, by paying higher wages, deter their workers from committing as much crime as
the unemployed and employed at the lower paying, lower productivity firms. Finally, Equilibrium
3 is where all agents commit the same amount of crime independent of their wage or labor force
status. It is critical to realize that if I am unable to reject Equilibrium 3 then I am unable to claim
employment or higher wages deter crime and therefore the justification of a job placement program
is lost.
3 Estimation
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) is used to estimate the parameters. Given the estimates,
I assess the effect employment frictions have on crime, unemployment and inequality.
3.1 Data
For the estimation I use data taken from the NLSY, a panel data set initiated within the U.S. in
1979. Starting in 1989 and ending in 1993, the NLSY contains weekly data on whether or not an
individual is incarcerated, while it contains data on an individual’s labor force status for the entire
panel. The time individuals spend in each state, whether employed, unemployed or incarcerated,
along with their wages when employed, are sufficient to identify the relevant parameters of the
model. Therefore, the model is estimated using data starting in 1989 and ending in 1993.
From the assumption bc < b < bnc, I break the sample into two subgroups, criminals and non-
criminals, or {bc,bnc}. I identify an individual as a criminal if I observe him to be incarcerated
during the sample period. If I never observe an individual to be incarcerated, I partition him into
the non-criminal sub-sample.9 In assuming observations are missing at random, I exclude them.
In addition, anyone exiting the labor market for reasons other than incarceration are excluded as
it is likely that the behavior of such individuals, at least in a certain period, deviates substantially
from the behavior as described in the model.10
9This type of partitioning creates latent variable bias when estimating the parameters of the non-criminal group
due to the fact criminal types could be in the non-criminal sample. However, I argue the bias is small due to previous
evidence that these groups have similar employment opportunities.
10The reader can refer to Engelhardt et al. (2007) for a discussion regarding the criminal behavior of agents outside
the labor force.
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For the non-criminal subgroup, the data begins with a duration of unemployment, t1. Unem-
ployment is interrupted by an agent becoming employed, d1,e = 1. Once employed the wage is
observed, w˜. The length of time an agent is employed at his first job is recorded as t2. At the end of
the employment period, the labor force status that the agent transitions to is recorded. They either
transition to unemployment, d2,u = 1, or become employed with a higher wage, d2,e = 1.
For the criminal subgroup, the data also begins with a period of unemployment, t1. However,
prior to this period an individual could have been incarcerated and the time he spent incarcerated is
t0, which is potentially left censored. For the criminal sub-group, unemployment is interrupted by
either an agent going to jail, d1,n = 1, or becoming employed, d1,e = 1. If employed, the wage is
observed, w˜. If the agent is incarcerated then the construction of the individual’s panel is complete.
However, if the agent becomes employed then the duration of employment is recorded as t2. At the
end of the employment period, the reason for exiting employment is recorded. The reasons include
incarceration, d2,n = 1, unemployment, d2,u = 1, or employment, d2,e = 1.
The descriptive statistics are found in Table 1. In interpreting the work histories, we see the
Table 1: Work History Sample Means
Variable Criminals Non-Criminals Full Sample
d1,n 0.1 0.02
d1,e 0.88 0.99 0.97
d2,e 0.11 0.19 0.17
d2,u 0.4 0.49 0.47
d2,n 0.19 0.03
t0 13.54 2.48
(10.21) (6.82)
t1 3.9 4.64 4.51
(6.7) (6.21) (6.31)
t2 20.53 26.1 25.08
(26.18) (19.44) (20.81)
w˜ 1034.48 1111.45 1097.34
(560.66) (705.8) (684.19)
N 209 931 1140
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Duration and wage statistics are monthly. Unemployment is
defined by individuals that claim at least some time is spent searching for work. Employment is defined
by those working at least 30 hours per week. The transition probabilities do not sum to one at each stage
because the data is right censored.
average wage of the criminal type is smaller than the non-criminal. Also, we find their average
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duration of unemployment is smaller. However, a smaller duration does not imply the criminal
types find jobs faster but rather they find a job or are caught committing crime and imprisoned
faster than non-criminals find a job. The same interpretation is true for the duration of employment.
It is important to note an attempt to estimate the model with an increased number of firm types
is unreasonable as I observe less than fifty individuals incarcerated while employed. Specifically,
a limited number of firms are used because each firm requires the estimation of an additional
parameter, Γ(ge,i). Therefore, I limit the number of firm types, or parameters Γ(ge,i), to two.
3.2 Likelihood Function
I will break down how the parameters are estimated using MLE. I build the likelihood on the as-
sumption that the model is correct and data on previous convictions is uninformative. In addition, I
assume in the model and build the likelihood function under the assumption that an individual does
not transition from a criminal to a non-criminal state or vice-versa. The likelihood of the sample
is obtained by multiplication of each individual’s contribution. To simplify the composition, I out-
line the criminal likelihood function as the non-criminal likelihood can be deduced by constraining
µpiΓ(gu) = µpiΓ(ge,L) = µpiΓ(ge,H) = 0.
In the data I observe criminals exiting jail and entering unemployment, and from the model, the
arrival rate of exiting is a Poisson process. As a result, the duration of incarceration is exponential.
Hence ρ is estimated by
P(t0) = ρe−ρt0.
The time t0 is the only period that is potentially left censored due to the choice of using flow sam-
pling at the point where individuals enter unemployment. Therefore, the likelihood contribution
of an individual panel which is left censored is P(t0) = e−ρt0 instead of P(t0) = ρe−ρt0 . Going
forward, right censoring of the data occurs and is accounted for in the estimation but is suppressed
in the composition until the complete likelihood is composed in Equation 1.
At the beginning of the sampling period, individuals are in the unemployed state and they
transition out of unemployment according to a Poisson process. Therefore, the duration of unem-
ployment, P(t1), is exponential. The likelihood function is
P(t1) = (µpiΓ(gu)+λ0)e−(µpiΓ(gu)+λ0)t1.
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The likelihood of transitioning to jail or employment after being unemployed, P(nt1) and P(et1)
respectively, is
P(nt1) =
µpiΓ(gu)
µpiΓ(gu)+λ0
, and
P(et1) =
λ0
µpiΓ(gu)+λ0
.
Obviously, for the non-criminal sub-group the probability of transitioning to jail is zero. If a
criminal type transitions to jail, then the individual’s contribution to the likelihood function ends.
Otherwise, an individual transitions to employment and receives a wage offer from the distribution
fc(w), which is the density function of Fc(w) derived in Equation 7 in the Appendix.
Depending upon the equilibrium, agents transition out of employment at different rates. The
differences in transition rates arise because employed agents might be employed at low or high
productivity firms. On the other hand, Proposition 2 argues that those employed by the same type
of firm take the same crime opportunities. In other words, agents employed by low productivity
firms transition out of employment at the same rate, and those employed at a high productivity
firms transition out of employment at the same rate.
From the model, agents employed by type i firms find their average time of employment to be
distributed exponentially. Hence, the duration of employment is
P(t2|w˜) = (µpiΓ(ge,i)+λ1(1−F(w˜))+δ )e−(µpiΓ(ge,i)+λ1(1−F(w˜))+δ )t2,
for i ∈ {L,H} depending on if w˜ ∈ [wL,c,wL,c] or w˜ ∈ [wH,c,wH,c].11
The likelihood of transitioning to a job, jail, or unemployment after being employed, P(et2),
P(nt2), and P(ut2), respectively, is
P(et2|w˜) =
λ1(1−F(w˜))
µpiΓ(ge,i)+λ1(1−F(w˜))+δ
,
P(nt2|w˜) =
µpiΓ(ge,i)
µpiΓ(ge,i)+λ1(1−F(w˜))+δ
, and
P(ut2|w˜) =
δ
µpiΓ(ge,i)+λ1(1−F(w˜))+δ
.
In summary, the likelihood function is constructed from
11As described in the Appendix, wi,c and wi,c is the lowest and highest wage paid by firms of type i ∈ {L,H}.
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• Wage offers:
w˜ = wage received ∼ f (w)12
• Duration times:
t0 = duration of jail ∼ P(t0)
t1 = duration of unemployment ∼ P(t1)
t2|w˜ = duration of job, conditional on w˜ ∼ P(t2|w˜)
• Transition indicators:
d1,e = 1 if unemployment-to-job transition, otherwise = 0
d1,n = 1 if unemployment-to-jail transition, otherwise = 0
d2,e = 1 if job-to-job transition, otherwise = 0
d2,n = 1 if job-to-jail transition, otherwise = 0
d2,u = 1 if job-to-unemployment transition, otherwise = 0
• Transition Probabilities:
unemployment-to-job transition ∼ P(et1)
unemployment-to-jail transition ∼ P(nt1)
job-to-job transition, conditional on w˜ ∼ P(et2|w˜)
job-to-jail transition, conditional on w˜ ∼ P(nt2|w˜)
job-to-unemployment, conditional on w˜ ∼ P(ut2|w˜)
The resulting likelihood function given by the model, dependent on the observed data (dura-
tions and transitions), is
l(θ) = P(t0)P(t1)P(nt1)
d1,n[P(et1) fc(w)P(t2) ∏
i=e,u,n
P(it2)
d2,i]d1,e, (1)
where θ = (ρ, λ0, λ1, δ , ϕ, µpiΓ(gu), µpiΓ(ge,L), µpiΓ(ge,H), wL,c,wH,c, wL,c, wH,c).13
12The wage offer distribution for the criminal type is
fc(w) =

ϕ(1+κ1)
2κ1
1√
(p1−wL,c)(p1−wL,c)
if wL,c ≤ w ≤ wL,c
(1−ϕ)(1+κ2)
2κ2
1√
(p2−wH,c)(p2−wH,c)
if wH,c ≤ w ≤ wH,c,
where κ1 = λ1ϕδ+µpiΓ(ge,L)+λ1(1−ϕ) and κ2 =
λ1(1−ϕ)
µpiΓ(ge,H )+δ
. The wage distribution is derived in the appendix including the
closed form solutions for wL,c and wH,c.
13Although suppressed in the text, the likelihood function accounts for both left and right censoring of durations.
The simplified form is
l(θ) = ρdn0 e−ρt0e−(µpiΓ(gu)+λ0)t2(µpiΓ(gu))d1,n
[λ0 fc(w)e−(µpiΓ(ge,i)+λ1(1−F(w˜))+δ )t2(µpiΓ(ge,i))d2,n(λ1(1−F(w˜)))d2,eδ d2,u ]d1,e ,
where dn0 = 1 if the duration of incarceration is not left censored.
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I propose super-efficient estimators
wL,c = min{w˜}, wL,c = w˜ϕ , wH,c = w˜1−ϕ , and wH,c = max{w˜}
where the estimators have been shown to be super-efficient and the theory of local cuts, Christensen
& Kiefer (1994), justifies conditioning on these estimates.14 The notation w˜ϕ represents the ϕ
percentile of the observed wage distribution, or in other words, ϕ defines the point between low
and high wage workers.
The parameters that are not individually estimated are (bc, bnc, z, µ, pi, Γ(g)). These estimates
are unobtainable due to the inability to measure the value of individual crime opportunities, the
number of crimes opportunities and the probability of being caught. However, if data on the total
value of crime, the aggregate number of crimes committed and the value of the crime when an
individual is caught were known, then the remaining parameters could be estimated. Derivation of
the likelihood in such a situation is given in the Appendix as well as an explanation about how the
currently estimated parameters and standard errors are left unchanged with the additional data.
3.3 Findings
The estimated parameter values are in Table 2.
The parameter estimates for the labor market frictions provide adequate reason to estimate the
model as they are significantly different than what Burdett et al. (2004) use to evaluate a similar
model. For instance, the job arrival rate implies that on average an individual, either previously
incarcerated or not, takes roughly eighteen weeks to find employment. The estimate is nearly three
times greater than the values found in Burdett et al. (2004), or Bowlus et al. (1995) who use the
same data set but earlier in the panel. Also, the job separation rate is at least two times faster
(higher) than estimates from similar models (van den Berg & Ridder (1998),Bontemps, Robin &
van den Berg (2000)). On the other hand, the on-the-job arrival rate is close to the related literature.
Using the parameter estimates from the full sample, I estimate the steady state unemployment
rate for non-criminals to be 8.5% while the unemployment rate for criminals is 12.5%. In addition,
the average wage offer as calculated from the model using the parameter estimates is $1,203 per
14These sample extremes serve as estimators of the unknown productivities and reservation wages as discussed in
Bowlus et al. (1995). Asymptotically to order N1/2 and ignoring the variability in estimates of the reservation wages
and productivities, Kiefer & Neumann (1991) show that the bias from these estimates is ignorable for sample sizes
over 200.
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Table 2: Parameters Estimates by bc, bnc, and the Full Sample
Parameters Criminals Non-Criminals Full Sample
ˆδ 0.022 0.020 0.020
[0.017, 0.028] [0.018, 0.021] [0.018, 0.022]
ˆλ0 0.226 0.213 0.215
[0.190, 0.277] [0.200, 0.231] [0.202, 0.232]
ˆλ1 0.013 0.011 0.011
[0.008, 0.018] [0.010, 0.014] [0.010, 0.014]
ϕˆ 0.794 0.880 0.880
[0.761, 0.908] [0.785, 0.897] [0.783, 0.897]
ρˆ 0.051 0.051
[0.045, 0.057] [0.045, 0.057]
ˆµpiΓ(gu) 0.026 0.026
[0.020, 0.033] [0.020, 0.033]
ˆµpiΓ(ge,L) 0.010 0.012
[0.007, 0.015] [0.007, 0.015]
ˆµpiΓ(ge,H) 0.011 0.006
[0.003, 0.020] [0.003, 0.019]
Note: Arrival rates are monthly. In the brackets are the 95% confidence interval from bootstrapping with
500 draws.
month for the criminal type and $1687 for the non-criminal. Since the parameters are taken from
the full sample and identical for each type, the difference in inequality and unemployment arises
solely from the fact that criminals are separated from their jobs at a faster rate due to incarceration.
In support of these results, I note Grogger (1995) takes a multi-stage regression approach and finds
that those previously incarcerated face only a slightly tougher job market. Also, the difference in
the average wage between the criminal and non-criminal agent is greater than what is observed in
the data. However, I argue that using two types of firms allows the model to fit the wage inequality
adequately as shown in Figure 2.
The key to the policy analysis comes from the estimation of µpiΓ(gu), µpiΓ(ge,L) and µpiΓ(ge,H).
They identify the equilibrium described in Section 2. As shown in Table 2, the estimate for
µpiΓ(gu) is significantly greater than µpiΓ(ge,L) and µpiΓ(ge,H). Therefore, I can reject Equi-
librium 3 with confidence. For the full sample, I find evidence that agents are deterred from crime
when paid a higher wage, or µpiΓ(ge,H)< µpiΓ(ge,L). All in all, I find evidence that employment,
and potentially higher wages, deter individuals from crime. In other words, economic incentives
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Figure 2: Wage Distribution
reduce criminal participation, or µpiΓ(ge,H)< µpiΓ(ge,L)< µpiΓ(gu).15
The criminal sub-sample are unable to reject Equilibrium 1 because of how µpiΓ(ge,L) and
µpiΓ(ge,H) rely on the estimate of ϕ . However, ϕ is estimated through the wage dispersion. It
might appear unreasonable to hinge estimates for criminal participation on considerations of the
shape of the wage distribution. So, I plot µpiΓ(ge,L) and µpiΓ(ge,H) for ϕ ∈ [.05, .95] where the
end points are excluded due to an inadequate number of observations.
Figure 3 demonstrates how ϕ affects criminal participation. The x-axis is labeled “Proportion
of Individuals on Lower End of (Wage) Distribution” because of the interpretation of the model.
The interpretation is low productivity firms, or firms who pay lower wages, are differentiated at
the point ϕ . Therefore, ϕ captures both the fraction of low productivity firms as well as what is
referred to as the lower end of the wage distribution. Hence, the model is estimated with ϕ from
low to high, and the corresponding incarceration rates are plotted.
It is interesting to see how wages affect criminal participation. Only at the upper and lower
end of the distribution do I find evidence that higher wages deter crime, although the confidence
interval is too wide at the lower end to provide any significant evidence.
15The model assumes the arrival rate of crime opportunities, µ , is identical for the unemployed and employed.
However, one might think the unemployed have more time and therefore have a higher arrival rate. If so, the estimates
of µpiΓ(ge,H), µpiΓ(ge,L) and µpiΓ(gu) would not change but rather the relative weight of µ and the acceptance
probability Γ(g). The relative size of each factor is not identified and therefore no comparison is made between the
arrival rates of the unemployed and employed.
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Figure 3: Criminal Participation with Full Sample
Note: I have plotted the 15th and 85th percentiles as confidence bands from the bootstrap sample.
3.4 Demographics
Other research has found that employment frictions are dependent upon occupation, age, and/or
education. In addition, crime is consistently found to be correlated to race, gender and an individ-
ual’s location of residence. I use the same approach as van den Berg & Ridder (1998) to analyze
how these variables are related to employment frictions and crime. Specifically, I introduce “het-
erogeneity by assuming that there are separate labor markets (or segments of the labor market, or
sub-markets) for different types of individuals,” (van den Berg & Ridder (1998) p. 1203). For
example, there exist separate markets for those with different education levels. An alternative ar-
gument would be urban/rural areas tend to have thicker/thinner labor markets. The result is the
model can be estimated separately by demographic.
The issue with this approach is the large number of observations needed in each category. For
instance, I observe very few females or college graduates committing crime. Also, the sample ages
in the initial period range from 24 to 32. Therefore, I limit the estimation by demographic in two
ways. First, I look at demographics which can be split into two sub-groups, i.e. {Black,White}.
Second, I restrict attention to demographics where each group retains at least 25% of the criminal
observations. Table 3 contains the demographic breakdown of the sample.
Table 4 contains the estimation results by demographic. The results show, almost universally,
that the unemployed are caught committing crime at a faster rate. Also, they demonstrate that rural
individuals, black individuals, and those without an education find jobs at a slower rate and lose
18
Table 3: Demographic Sample Means
Variable Criminals Non-Criminals Full Sample
Male 0.92 0.54 0.61
Married 0.13 0.33 0.29
Black 0.53 0.33 0.37
White 0.39 0.61 0.57
Urban 0.74 0.76 0.76
Rural 0.26 0.24 0.24
High School Diploma 0.51 0.74 0.7
Older than 28 0.43 0.44 0.44
their jobs faster. In addition, individuals facing a tougher job market tend to commit more crime
when unemployed with the exception of high school graduates. The findings align themselves
with other empirical studies. For instance, Grogger (1998) and many others find race is correlated
with criminal participation. Also, Uggen (2000) finds older criminals have a lower likelihood of
criminal participation when employed which is what I estimate for those employed at the upper
end of the wage distribution. Surprisingly, I find those living in rural areas have a slightly higher
incarceration rate which runs contrary to many findings. However, the results on criminal par-
ticipation have large confidence bands due to the limited number of observations. Therefore, the
results should be interpreted accordingly.
3.5 Model Evaluation
I have provided evidence that economic incentives play a role in criminal behavior. At this point,
I evaluate how well the model predicts recidivism rates as well as the elasticity between crime,
incarceration and the likelihood of apprehension.
Policy makers and researchers alike concern themselves with recidivism rates. Although not
previously discussed, the model is set up to evaluate recidivism.16 The prediction of the recidivism
16Recidivism can be defined as given a convicted criminal just left jail, what is the probability the criminal will
return to jail within “t” periods. The calculation can be considered as a function of the Markov transition matrix
between (uc,eL,c,eH,c) where
P =
 (1−λ0) λ0ϕ λ0(1−ϕ)δ (1−δ )(1−λ1)+(1−δ )λ1ϕ (1−δ )λ1(1−ϕ)
δ 0 (1−δ )
 .
In words, the probability of going to jail in the tth period, Φ(t), is dependent on if he gets caught, pi , the opportunity to
commit a crime, µ , if he takes it dependent on his employment state, (Γ(gu)Pt1,1 +Γ(ge,L)Pt1,2 +Γ(ge,H)Pt1,3), and he
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rates for 6, 12, 24, and 36 months are in Table 5 using the estimated parameters from the full
sample. I am unable to make an exact comparison between the model and the data because the two
contain different measures of recidivism. Thus, I include several different measures found in the
data. What I see is that the estimated model, which captures those who returned to prison for new
and old offenses, generally lies between the U.S. recidivism rates of those reconvicted and those
returned to prison for a new offense.
Table 5: Prediction of Recidivism Rates
U.S. Data
Model with Returned to prison
Full Sample Rearrested Reconvicted for new offense
Rec6 (%) 11.5 29.9 10.6 5.1
Rec12 (%) 18.7 44.1 21.5 10.6
Rec24 (%) 30.2 59.2 36.4 19.2
Rec36 (%) 39.9 67.4 46.2 25.8
Note: U.S. data are reported by the Bureau of Justice Statistics for the time period 1994-1997.
Besides recidivism, the model is capable of predicting the elasticity of crime with respect to
the average time spent incarcerated ( 1ρ ) and the number incarcerated (nc) from a change in ρ . The
elasticities can be calculated from Table 6.17 In general, changes in ρ can have two effects on
deterring crime. This exercise captures the incapacitation effect (keeping criminals off the streets)
and not the crime deterrence effect. The reason I do not evaluate the deterrence effect is because
not all the parameters are identified in the estimation procedure. On the other hand, a sufficiently
small change in ρ only alters the incapacitation effect and not the equilibrium/deterrence effect
because Γ(g) is discrete.
Table 6: Changes in the Duration of Incaceration (ρ)
ρ
0.031 0.051 0.071
Unemployed Criminals (%) 8.9 10 10.6
Incarcerated Criminals (%) 29.2 20.1 15.3
Employed Criminals (%) 61.9 69.9 74.1
Crime Index 88.54 100 105.99
Note: Crime is indexed because pi is not uniquely identified.
did not go to jail in the previous periods. Analytically it is Φ(t) = piµ(Γ(gu)Pt1,1+Γ(ge,L)Pt1,2+Γ(ge,H)Pt1,3)(1−Rect)
where the recidivism rate, Rect , is he goes to jail before the tth period, or Rect = ∑ti=1 Φ(i).
17Estimates for the recidivism rate and wage distribution are excluded because they are not a function of ρ .
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I find the elasticity of crime with respect to the average time spent incarcerated, 1ρ , to be -0.18.
My findings are an improvement from previous models such as Burdett et al. (2004) as my results
align themselves with several other empirically based studies outlined in Levitt (2004) who argues
“Typical estimates of elasticities of crime with respect to expected punishment range from -0.1 and
-0.4” (p. 178).
Alternatively, the elasticity of crime with respect to the prison population has been debated.
The question’s relevance is rooted in the costs prisons incur on state and federal budgets. My
estimate of the elasticity of crime with respect to the population incarcerated due to a rise in ρ is -
0.25 and is in line with Levitt (1996) who states “The elasticities with respect to prison populations
range from -0.147 to -0.703.” (p. 178).
The final comparison I make is how crime rates change with respect to the probability of being
caught. I find the elasticity of crime with respect to the probability of apprehension to be -0.19
as seen in Table 7. How the estimate compares to the literature is not completely clear, as it is
hard to measure. However, Levitt (1997) finds the elasticity of crime with respect to the number
of police to be between -0.05 and -1.98. Therefore, if the apprehension technology is linear in the
quantity of police, then my estimate is within the range of the crime literature albeit the range is
large. Finally, it is important to point out that an increase in pi destroys jobs. Table 7 shows an
increase in the probability of being caught reduces the amount of employed criminals.
Table 7: Changes in the Likelihood of Apprehension (pi)
Likelihood of Apprehension Index
50 100 150
Unemployed Criminals (%) 9.4 10 10.4
Incarcerated Criminals (%) 10.9 20.1 27.8
Employed Criminals (%) 79.6 69.9 61.8
Crime Index 109.01 100 92.26
Rec12 9.79 18.7 26.81
Rec36 22.42 39.93 53.58
Average Wage of Criminals 1306.33 1202.67 1123.46
Note: Crime and the likelihood of apprehension are indexed because pi is not uniquely identified.
To reiterate, the model shows it is able to accurately predict the appropriate elasticities of crime
with respect to time incarcerated, the size of the prison population and the likelihood of apprehen-
sion. In addition, the model is in the range of U.S. recidivism rates while accurately capturing
crime, inequality, and unemployment. The results are innovative within the crime literature be-
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cause the predictions are based on estimates from a structural model.
4 Policy Discussion
The main result highlighted in the introduction is that reductions in labor market frictions can re-
duce crime. Although the model does not explain how frictions are reduced, Wilson, Gallagher,
Coggeshall & MacKenzie (1999), Visher et al. (2005) and others analyze the effectiveness of spe-
cific job placement programs. Alternatively, I calculate in Table 8 the effects of a successful pro-
gram. Specifically, how does crime change given a placement program that works. I find the
elasticity of crime with respect to the average time unemployed ( 1λ0 ) to be 0.11. Also, recidivism
falls as it becomes easier to find a job. The reason is individuals commit half as much crime when
employed. Therefore, if released inmates find jobs faster, then they commit fewer crimes and do
not return as quickly. In effect, reducing employment frictions by half could reduce crime and
recidivism by more than five percent. Note that the effect is purely employment driven, as the
average wage is constant.
The elasticity of a job placement program might seem “small.” However, the policy is primar-
ily affecting a small part of the population, the unemployed. In addition, U.S. law enforcement
observes roughly ten million crimes per year. Therefore, a five percent reduction would eliminate
more than a half of a million crimes annually. Finally, other anti-crime policies have a “small”
elasticity such as an increase in incarceration. Therefore, the costs are essential in evaluating the
success of a job placement program.
Table 8: Changes in the Unemployed Job Arrival Rate (λ0)
λ0
0.108 0.215 0.43
Unemployed Criminals (%) 17.4 10 5.4
Incarcerated Criminals (%) 21.9 20.1 18.9
Employed Criminals (%) 60.7 69.9 75.6
Crime Index 109 100 94.39
Rec12 (%) 21.6 18.7 16.1
Rec36 (%) 44.5 39.9 36.9
Average Wage of Criminals 1202.67 1202.67 1202.67
Note: Crime is indexed because pi is not uniquely identified.
Job placement programs can take many different forms. Consider the costs and benefits of
a residential re-entry center (RRC). RRC’s provide a structured environment for convicts being
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released from jail. In particular, they limit the time individuals are outside of the center. The time
individuals are allowed outside of the center is closely monitored and used mainly for job searching
or employment.
The cost-benefit analysis of an RRC using the estimated model is insightful. The costs of an
RRC can range widely between one and three thousand dollars per person per month depending
upon the location and environment. The benefits can range widely as well. As shown above, the
benefit an RRC provides in reducing crime depends upon an individual’s labor force status because
the unemployed commit twice as much crime as those employed. In evaluating the benefits of
an RRC, assume they deter agents from committing crime, and the probability of being caught
and incarcerated is 2.5%. In addition, the average cost of a crime (excluding murder) is roughly
$4,255.18 The bottom line is benefits from an RRC, or the reduction in crime, is worth $4,425
per month for those unemployed, as they commit roughly 1.03 crimes per month. In addition, the
benefits for an employed criminal type is between $1,020-2,040, as they would commit on average
between 0.24 and 0.48 crimes per month depending upon their wage. Therefore, the benefits
discussed above are greater than the costs when the resident of an RRC is unemployed but not
necessarily while employed.
The benefits might not outweigh the costs of holding an employed individual in an RRC. How-
ever, what is the effect of an increase in the job finding rate for an employed individual? The
purpose would be to reduce the crime rate of the employed by finding them higher paying jobs.
The results are found in Table 9. First, notice the expected wage rises as individuals are finding bet-
ter paying jobs at a faster rate. Second, the policy has very little affect on the short run recidivism
rate, as those exiting jail take time to find their first job let alone a second. Third, the equilibrium
crime rate falls only slightly, as the number of individuals finding a high productivity firm, or “low
crime” job, is small. As a result, halving the time it takes to receive a new job offer reduces the
crime rate by roughly 1%.
5 Conclusion
I have proposed an on-the-job search model of crime that incorporates heterogeneous agents, firms
and crime opportunities. The heterogeneity allows for a more efficient equilibrium, a better esti-
18The average cost is taken from Cohen (1988) and adjusted for inflation using the CPI.
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Table 9: Changes in the Employed Job Arrival Rate (λ1)
λ1
0.006 0.011 0.022
Unemployed Criminals (%) 10.1 10 10
Incarcerated Criminals (%) 20.2 20.1 19.8
Employed Low Wage Criminals (%) 58.3 57 54.7
Employed High Wage Criminals (%) 11.5 12.9 15.5
Crime Index 100.68 100 98.72
Rec12 (%) 18.7 18.7 18.7
Rec36 (%) 40 39.9 39.8
Average Wage of Criminals 933.59 1202.67 1655.25
Note: Crime is indexed because pi is not uniquely identified.
mate of wage dispersion, for agents to commit crime at different rates conditional on employment
and wages, and results in a proportion of agents declining criminal opportunities based on their
individual value of leisure.
Furthermore, I have developed a procedure to estimate the model. The major result being
economic incentives, in particular employment frictions and wages, affect crime.
Given the incentives between crime, unemployment and wage inequality, I argue policies aimed
at reducing employment frictions can improve the labor market for criminals and in turn decrease
crime. I find that a successful job placement program, one capable of cutting the average length of
unemployment by two months, can reduce crime and recidivism by more than five percent.
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A Appendix
A.1 Wage dispersion
At this point, I develop the remaining part of the model required in estimation. Specifically, I
develop Fc(w). The development of Fc(w) follows from the work of Mortensen (1990) and Burdett
et al. (2004). The distribution of wages posted for the non-criminal market, Fnc(w), is derived in
Mortensen (1990) and therefore excluded. As the “non-criminal labor market” has been previously
derived, I will drop the c subscript on R, w and F(w). In other words, I am analyzing the criminal
market with two types of firms and one type of agent. Proposition 1 justifies why only one type of
agent is needed to estimate the “criminal labor market.”
To begin, I provide Lemma 1 in order to characterize F(w). Lemma 1 is stated generically with
the understanding that some cases are vacuous. Let w be the lower support of F(w), wi and wi is
the lowest and highest wage paid by a firm of type i, Πi(·) is firm i profit, C(g) is the reservation
wage necessary to deter an agent from crime g, and L(w) is the amount of labor a firm retains in
the steady-state when offering a wage w.
Lemma 1 1. F(w) has no mass points, 2. wL = R or wL = C(g) for a g ∈ G , 3. There are no
gaps in F(w) except on the intervals (C(g)− ε j,C(g)), where ε j > 0 for all g ∈ G , 4. wL = wH or
wH =C(g), and 5. L(w) is increasing in w.
Proof.
1. Suppose F(w) has a mass point at w′. By offering w′+ ε the firm would increase their labor
market supply by a discrete amount, implying w′+ ε has a larger profit and firms deviate to
the slightly higher wage until no mass point exists.
2. Suppose all firms offer R+ε ≤ w where ε > 0. A firm paying R+ε would deviate to paying
R because they would be paying the worker less while they would lose workers at the same
rate, therefore increasing profits. The identical argument can be made but replacing R with
C(g).
3. Suppose a firm offers w′− ε arbitrary close to C(g), then by offering C(g) the firm could
decrease their job destruction rate by a discrete amount because they would not be losing
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workers to prison, implying an increase in profits. Therefore, no firms offer wages within
(C(g)− ε j,C(g)).
4. Same argument as Lemma 1.3.
5. First, considering L(w) ∈ [wL,wL] or [wH ,wH ] separately allows one to apply the proof of
Mortensen (1990) Proposition 3. Second, L(C(g)− ε j)< L(C(g)) holds because for both to
exist then Πi(C(g)−ε j)≤Πi(C(g)) and C(g)−ε j <C(g) implying L(C(g)−ε j)< L(C(g)).
I refer several times in the body of the text to the fact that higher productive firms pay more
than lower productive firms. Here, I restate Proposition 3 as
Lemma 2 pL < pH ⇒ wL ≤ wH .
Proof.
The proof is in two steps. First, I show it holds for wages offered within [C(g),C(g′)] where g < g′
on the support G . Second, I show it holds across any crime wage C(g) for g ∈ G .
1. For firms L and H offering wages in [C(g),C(g′)] then wL ≤ wH because L(w) ∈ [wL,wL]
or [wH ,wH ] is continuous and increasing in w implying Mortensen (1990) Proposition 3
applies.
2. Suppose there are two firms (L and H), paying above and below C(g), then ∃ wC(g) <C(g)
and C(g)< wC(g) such that ΠL(wC(g)) = ΠL(wC(g)) and ΠH(wC(g)) = ΠH(wC(g)), but if
(pL−wC(g))L(wC(g)) = (pL−wC(g))L(wc)⇒
wC(g)L(C)−wC(g)L(wC(g)) = pL(L(wC(g))−L(wC(g)))⇒
wC(g)L(wC(g))−wC(g)L(wC(g))< pH(L(wC(g))−L(wC(g)))⇒
(pH −wC(g))L(wC(g))< (pH −wC(g))L(wC(g))
⇒ no H firm would offer wC(g).
I have proven F(w) is continuous on the support except below the points C(g) for all g ∈ G .
From Lemma 2, I will break down the distribution of F(w) into parts
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F i(wi) = F(w|wi ≤ w ≤ wi), f or i ∈ {L,H} (2)
It is key to derive the wages being paid, G(w), in order to back out F(w). Therefore, define
G(w) as
Gi(wi) = G(w|wi ≤ w ≤ wi), f or i ∈ {L,H} (3)
where G(w) is defined explicitly for the two firms as19
GL(wL) = F
L(wL)
(1+κ1(1−FL(wL)) , and
GH(wH) = F
H(wH)
1+κ2(1−FH(wH)) ,
(4)
where κ1 = λ1ϕδ+µpiΓ(ge,L)+λ1(1−ϕ) and κ2 =
λ1(1−ϕ)
µpiΓ(ge,H)+δ
.
The rest of the necessary steps in attaining F(w) in closed form can be summarized in two
steps. The first is to derive L(w) from LL(wL) = eL,c
dGL(wL)
dw
dFL(wL)
dw
and LH(wH) = eH,c
dGH (wH )
dw
dFH (wH )
dw
. The
second and final step in attaining F(w) plugs L(w) into the profit function of a firm, Πi(wi), then
sets the equilibrium condition that firms of the same type make the same profit, Πi(wi) = Πi(wi),
along with F i(wi) = 0. The result is
FL(wL) = 1+κ1κ1 (1−
√
(pL−wL)
(pL−wL)),
FH(wH) = 1+κ2κ2 (1−
√
(pH−wH)
(pH−wH)),
(5)
and wL and wH are derived using FL(wL) = 1 and FH(wH) = 1, or
19 Setting the time derivatives equal to zero gives you equation 4
d
dt G
L(wL)eL,c = λ0ukϕFL(wL)− (δ +µpiΓ(ge,L)+λ1(1−ϕ)+λ1ϕ(1−FL(wL)))eL,cGL(wL),
d
dt G
H(wH)eH,c = (λ0uk +λ1eL,c)(1−ϕ)FH(wH)− (δ +µpiΓ(ge,H)+λ1(1−ϕ)(1−FH(wH)))eH,cGH(wH),
where the steady state flows are:
uk = (δ +µpiΓ(ge,L)+λ1(1−ϕ))ρ(δ +µpiΓ(ge,H))/Ω,
eL,c = λ0ϕρ(δ +µpiΓ(ge,H))/Ω,
eH,c = (δ +µpiΓ(ge,L)+λ1)(1+ϕ)ρλ0/Ω,
and Ω = uk +nk + eL,c + eH,c.
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wL = pL− (pL−wL)( 11+κ1 )2,
wH = pH − (pH −wH)( 11+κ2 )2.
(6)
Therefore, the necessary equation in estimation is
Fc(w) =

0 if w < wL
ϕFL(wL) if wL ≤ w ≤ wL
ϕ if wL ≤ w ≤ wH
ϕ+(1−ϕ)FH(wH) if wH ≤ w ≤ wH
1 if wH < w
, (7)
which is continuous by Lemma 1 in the support as defined in Equation 7 and differential except at
the points wi and wi for i ∈ {L,H}.
A.2 Candidate Likelihood Function
In this section, I derive a candidate likelihood function that identifies all of the parameters including
(bc, bnc, z, pi, Γ(g)).20 In addition, I discuss how the parameters I have already estimated are left
unchanged when estimating the unknown parameters.
The likelihood function requires two additional types of data. The data necessary to estimate
the remaining parameters are
1. the value of crime when an individual is caught,
2. the aggregate number of crimes committed,B.
In effect, Γ(g) can be deduced using data about the value of the crime when an individual is
caught. The discrete pdf γ(g) of Γ(g) is incorporated into the likelihood as
l(θ) = ρdn0 e−ρt0e−(µpiΓ(gu)+λ0)t2(µpiΓ(gu)γ(g))d1,n
[λ0 fc(w)e−(µpiΓ(ge,i)+λ1(1−F(w˜))+δ )t2(µpiΓ(ge,i)γ(g))d2,n(λ1(1−F(w˜)))d2,eδ d2,u]d1,e,
(8)
where γ(g) is identified using a clustering type method up to the relative frequency of each occur-
rence on the domain G .
Next, pi can be deduced by the aggregate moment
20µ can be normalized to a sufficiently large number without loss of generality. Therefore, it is excluded from the
discussion.
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pi =
ˆµpiΓ(gu)uc + ˆµpiΓ(ge,L)eL,c + ˆµpiΓ(ge,H)eH,c
B
,
where the parameters in the numerator are identified by Equation 8. This argument is similar
to Flinn (2006), who uses an aggregate measure of firm profits to estimate one parameter of the
model, specifically bargaining power.
Finally, (bc, bnc, z) can be deduced from the previously identified parameters and the super-
efficient estimators wL,c and wH,c. The reservation wages [C(ge,L),C(ge,H)] or [R,C(ge,H)] are
deduced from the model. To find them, realize the flow Bellman equations of the incarcerated,
unemployed and those employed at the low and high wage firms are
rJ = z+ρ(V0− J), (9)
rV0 = b+µ ∑
g>gu
γ(g)(g+pi(J−V0))+λ0∆(CL), (10)
rV1 = C(ge,L)+δ (V0−V1)+µ ∑
g>ge,L
γ(g)(g+pi(J−V1))+λ1∆(CL), (11)
rV2 = C(ge,H)+δ (V0−V2)+µ ∑
g>ge,H
γ(g)(g+pi(J−V2))+λ1∆(CH), (12)
respectively, where
∆(Ci) =
∫
Rc
1−F(x)
r+δ +µpi(1−Γ(ge,i))+λ1(1−F(x))dx, or
∆(Ci) =
∫
C(ge,i)
1−F(x)
r+δ +µpi(1−Γ(ge,i))+λ1(1−F(x))dx,
depending upon if ˆµpiΓ(gu) = ˆµpiΓ(ge,L) or not, respectively. Also, the threshold values of crime
opportunities are
V1 = J +
ge,L
pi
,
V2 = J +
ge,H
pi
.
As a result, Equation 9-12 can be reduced to two equations and two unknowns, (bc,z), given the
estimated parameters and setting C(ge,L) = wL,c and C(ge,H) = wH,c. I leave it to the reader to
show they identify both (bc,z) given ge,L 6= ge,H . Also, it should be noted that identification of
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the remaining two parameters is dependent upon the type of equilibrium deduced in the first stage.
For example, the reservation wage should be used as one of the equilibrium conditions to deduce
(bc,z) if Γu = Γe,L. Finally, bnc is deduced from the non-criminal reservation wage.
To conclude, the reader should realize the estimates of these parameters will not affect the ones
already estimated in the body of the paper. To see this, notice estimates for Γ(g) are independent
of the rest of the likelihood. In addition, pi is estimated from one aggregate moment. Finally,
(bc, z) are found using the restrictions of the model. Therefore, the estimates of (ρˆ , ˆλ0, ˆλ1, ˆδ , ϕˆ ,
ˆµpiΓ(gu), ˆµpiΓ(ge,L), ˆµpiΓ(ge,H)) found in Section 3 are independent of the estimates of (bc, bnc,
z, pi , Γ(g)).
31
References
Bontemps, C., Robin, J. & van den Berg, G. J. (1999), ‘An Empirical Equilibrium Job Search
Model with Search on the Job and Heterogeneous Workers and Firms’, International Economic
Review 40, 1039–74.
Bontemps, C., Robin, J. & van den Berg, G. J. (2000), ‘Equilibrium Search with Continuous Pro-
ductivity Dispersion: Theory and Nonparametric Estimation’, International Economic Review
41, 305–58.
Bowlus, A. J., Kiefer, N. M. & Neumann, G. R. (1995), ‘Estimation of Equilibrium Wage Distrib-
utions with Heterogeneity’, Journal of Applied Econometrics 10, S119–S131.
Burdett, K., Lagos, R. & Wright, R. (2003), ‘Crime, Inequality, and Unemployment’, American
Economic Review 93, 1764–77.
Burdett, K., Lagos, R. & Wright, R. (2004), ‘An On-the-Job Search Model of Crime, Inequality,
and Unemployment’, International Economic Review 45, 681–706.
Burdett, K. & Mortensen, D. T. (1998), ‘Wage Differentials, Employer Size and Unemployment’,
International Economic Review 39, 257–73.
Christensen, B. J. & Kiefer, N. M. (1994), ‘Local Cuts and Separate Inference’, Scandinavian
Journal of Statistics 21, 389–401.
Chung, C., Schmidt, P. & Witte, A. D. (1991), ‘Survival Analysis: A Survey’, Journal of Quanti-
tative Criminology 7, 59–98.
Cohen, M. (1988), ‘Pain, Suffering, and Jury Awards: A Study of the Cost of Crime to Victims’,
Law and Society Review 22, 537–556.
Eckstein, Z. & Wolpin, K. I. (1995), ‘Duration to First Job and the Return to Schooling: Estimates
from a Search-Matching Model’, The Review of Economic Studies 62, 263–286.
Engelhardt, B., Rocheteau, G. & Rupert, P. (2007), Crime and the Labor Market: A Search Model
with Optimal Contracts. Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper 0715.
32
Flinn, C. J. (2006), ‘Minimum Wage Effects on Labor Market Outcomes Under Search, Matching,
and Endogeneous Contact Rates’, Econometrica 74, 1013–1062.
Gould, E. D., Weinberg, B. A. & Mustard, D. B. (2002), ‘Crime Rates and Local Labor Market
Opportunities in the United States: 1979-1997’, The Review of Economics and Statistics 84, 45–
61.
Grogger, J. (1995), ‘The Effect of Arrests on the Employment and Earnings of Young Men’, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 51–72.
Grogger, J. (1998), ‘Market Wages and Youth Crime’, Journal of Labor Economics 16, 756–91.
Imrohorog˘lu, A., Merlo, A. & Rupert, P. (2000), ‘On the Political Economy of Income Redistrib-
ution and Crime’, International Economic Review 41, 1–25.
Kiefer, N. M. & Neumann, G. R. (1991), Estimation of Equilibrium Wage Distributions with
Heterogeneity. Princeton University, Mimeo.
Levitt, S. D. (1996), ‘The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison
Overcrowding Litigation’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, 319–51.
Levitt, S. D. (1997), ‘Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on
Crime’, American Economic Review 87, 270–90.
Levitt, S. D. (2004), ‘Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the
Decline and Six that Do Not’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, 163–90.
Mortensen, D. T. (1990), Equilibrium Wage Distributions: A Synthesis, J. Hartog, G. Ridder, and
J. Theeuwes edn, North-Holland, New York, pp. 279–96.
Piehl, A. & DiIulio, J. (1995), ‘Does Prison Pay? Revisited’, The Brookings Review (Winter), 21–
25.
Uggen, C. (2000), ‘Work as a Turning Point in the Life Course of Criminals: A Duration Model of
Age, Employment, and Recidivism’, American Sociological Review 65, 529–546.
van den Berg, G. J. & Ridder, G. (1998), ‘An Empirical Equilibrium Search Model of the Labor
Market’, Econometrica 66, 1183–1221.
33
Visher, C. A., Winterfield, L. & Coggeshall, M. B. (2005), ‘Ex-offender Employment Programs
and Recidivism: A Meta-Analysis’, Journal of Experimental Criminology 1, 295–316.
Wilson, D. B., Gallagher, C. A., Coggeshall, M. B. & MacKenzie, D. L. (1999), ‘A Quantita-
tive Review and Description of Corrections-Based Education, Vocation, and Work Programs.’,
Corrections Management Quarterly 3, 8–18.
34
